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THE WARSAW CONVENTION ARTICLE 28, THE





U NDER UNITED STATES statutory and common law, a
court generally has jurisdiction over a cause of action if the
court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, jurisdiction of the
person, and jurisdiction over the particular judgment sought.'
But if the tort in issue occurred when the plaintiff was embark-
ing, disembarking, or during an international flight, then the
traditional notions of jurisdiction are preempted by The Con-
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Transportation by Air (Warsaw Convention or Warsaw),
which provides its own unique cause of action and jurisdictional
rules.2 Under Warsaw, the plaintiffs choice of forum is no
longer plaintiff-oriented; rather it becomes affiliated with the
defendant's place of business and is subject to challenge by the
defendant.
This article gives an overview of the Warsaw Convention, with
particular emphasis on Article 28(1), and a brief description of
the subsequent international protocols and conventions amend-
ing Warsaw. It then analyzes the United States doctrine of fo-
* Allan I. Mendelsohn, currently an Adjunct Professor of Conflicts of Law and
International Transportation Law at Georgetown Law Center, is in private
practice with Sher & Blackwell in Washington, D.C. He is on the Advisory Board
of this Journal and served in the U.S. Department of State as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Transportation Affairs.
** Ren~e Lieux is a LL.M. Candidate at Georgetown Law Center and is in
private practice in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
1 77 AM. JUR. 2d Courts 54 (2002).
2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Star. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (West 2001) [hereinafter Warsaw Con-
vention or Warsaw].
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rum non conveniens and the interaction between the doctrine
and Warsaw. Next, it briefly focuses on the applicability of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties, which play some
role in the application of the forum non convienens doctrine to
foreign plaintiffs. It then critically reviews the important deci-
sion in In re Air Crash off Long Island New York on July 17, 1996.'
Finally, this article briefly examines the Ninth Circuit's recent
decision in Hosaka v. United Airlines4 and speculates about its po-
tential impact on the emerging law in this increasingly signifi-
cant area of international law.
II. ARTICLE 28 OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
A. INTRODUCTION To THE WARSAW CONVENTION
In 1925, with the commercial airline industry still in its forma-
tive years, delegates from around the world met in Paris to con-
struct the groundwork for international civil aviation law.5
Those attending the Paris Conference created the Comite Interna-
tional Technique d'Experts Juridique Aeriens, which continued work-
ing on the draft document until the conference held in Warsaw
in 1929, at which time the Warsaw Convention was born. It
came into force on February 13, 1933, and, without the benefit
of Congressional hearings, the United States became a party in
1934 by Proclamation of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.6 The
Warsaw Convention was subsequently amended on numerous
occasions,7 but the United States was not a party to most of these
3 In reAir Crash off Long Island New York on July 17, 1996, 65 F. Supp. 3d 207
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
4 Hosaka v. United Airlines, 305 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2002).
5 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld and Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498 (1967).
6 See id. at 501-02.
7 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929,
opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 372 [hereinafter Hague Proto-
col]; Convention Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person
Other than the Contracting Carrier, Sept. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 32 [hereinafter
Guadalajara Protocol]; Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12
October 1929, as Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 September
1955, opened for signature Mar. 8, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 613, ICAO Doc. 8932 [hereinaf-
ter Guatemala City Protocol]; Additional Protocol No. 1 to Amend the Conven-
tion for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as Amended by the Protocol done at
The Hague on 28 September 1955, opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc.
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amendments. The one amendment to which the U.S. did be-
come a party (i.e., Montreal Protocol No. 4) did not amend the
provisions of Warsaw Article 28, which is of most concern here.8
Before Warsaw standardized industry liability, the nature of
international air-travel could expose an airline to widely varying
laws, depending upon the country in which the accident oc-
curred and where jurisdiction would be found. The original
1929 multilateral treaty was an effort to establish uniformity in
principles of liability and in the laws governing the documents
issued to passengers and shippers in international air
transportation:9
The Convention had two primary goals: first, to establish uni-
formity in the aviation industry with regard to the procedure for
dealing with claims arising out of international transportation
and the substantive law applicable to such claims, as well as with
regard to documentation such as tickets and waybills; second-
clearly the overriding purpose-to limit air carriers' potential lia-
bility in the event of accidents."0
The drafters had a direct interest in limiting air carrier liabil-
ity. At the time of the Convention, most airlines were owned or
heavily subsidized by the nations that were drafting the Conven-
tion. Limiting liability would allow airlines to raise necessary
capital, to provide a basis for insurance rate determinations, and
9145 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 1]; Additional Protocol No. 2 to Amend
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as Amended by the Proto-
col done at The Hague on 28 September 1955, opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975,
I.C.A.O. Doc. 9146 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 2]; Additional Protocol
No. 3 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as
Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 September 1955 and at
Guatemala City on 8 March 1971, opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc.
9147 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 3]; Additional Protocol No. 4 to Amend
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as Amended by the Proto-
col done at The Hague on 28 September 1955, opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975,
reprinted in Sec. Rep. No. 105-20 at 21-32 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 4].
8 Montreal Protocol No. 4 entered into force for the United States on March 4,
1999. Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 7, at E4.
9 Tory A. Weigand, Accident, Exclusivity, and Passenger Disturbances Under the War-
saw Convention, 16 Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 891, 899 (2001).
10 In re Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267,
1270 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation omitted).
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to reduce inconsistent outcomes. This would in turn limit the
financial risks to their governments and lessen litigation.1
The Warsaw Convention applies to "all international transpor-
tation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for
hire.' 2 It applies to three categories of injury or damage: pas-
senger death or bodily injury,13 loss or destruction of checked
baggage or goods,'" and damage resulting from the delay of pas-
sengers, baggage, or goods.' 5 In its original form, the Conven-
tion limited the airline's liability to approximately $8,300 per
passenger, unless the plaintiff could prove willful misconduct.
16
For most practical purposes, the Warsaw Convention "creates a
nearly irrefutable presumption of liability and provides a judicial
forum for the injured traveler, but at a cost to the claimant of
severely limiting the damages recoverable against the carrier."' 7
B. ARTICLE 28
Article 28 of the Convention provides treaty jurisdiction for
claims falling within Warsaw's liability provisions. 8 Under
United States law, if a court does not have treaty jurisdiction
I Id. at 1271 (citing Sen. Comm. on For. Relations, Message from the President of
the United States Transmitting a Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules, Sen.
Exec. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934) (Secretary of State Cordell
Hull)).
12 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 1, at 3014.
Article 17 provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suf-
fered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking.
Id. art. 17, at 3018. There has been a good deal of recent litigation over the term
"bodily injury" and whether it includes mental or emotional injury. See, e.g., East-
ern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991); Carey v. UAL, 255 F.3rd 1044 (9th Cir.
2001); Bobian v. CSA Czech Airlines, Civ. No. 02-1627 (DRD), 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22065 (D. NJ. Oct. 30, 2002).
14 Article 18(1) provides: "The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in
the event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any checked baggage or
any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took place
during the transportation by air." Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 18(1), at
3019.
15 Article 19 provides: "The carrier shall be liable for damage occasioned by
delay in the transportation by air of passengers, baggage, or goods." Id.
16 See id. arts. 22, 25, at 3019-20.
17 Coyle v. P.T. Garuda Indonesia, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D. Or. 2001).
18 See S. R. Shapiro, Construction and Validity of "Venue" or 'Jurisdiction" Provision
of Article 28(1) of Warsaw Convention (49 Stat 3000 et. seq.) Relating to International
Transportation by Air, 6 A.L.R.3d 1272 (1966).
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under Article 28(1), then federal jurisdiction cannot be estab-
lished under the "arising under" clause of 28 U.S.C. §1331.19 Ar-
ticle 28 provides:
1. An action for damages must be brought, at the option of
the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Con-
tracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of
the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where
he has a place of business through which the contract has
been made, or before the court at the place of the
destination.20
2. Questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of
the court to which the case is submitted.
Article 28 limits the fora in which the plaintiff may bring a
cause of action to the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties. The plaintiff may select the initial forum for the action,
but is limited to the four fora listed. These sites are all carrier-
oriented, rather than plaintiff-oriented. The domicile or princi-
pal place of business of the carrier, where the carrier has a place
of business at which the contract was made, or the place of desti-
nation, all focus primarily upon the convenience of the carrier.
19 It was once thought that Warsaw did not create a cause of action. That has
since changed. See Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 915 (2d
Cir. 1978).
20 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 28, at 1324. The Convention may well
be the world's most widely ratified private international law treaty, with 150 par-
ties. See ICAO Treaty Collection, at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/wc-
hp.htm, for an up-to-date list of the High Contracting Parties.
The British translation of Article 28 differs from that of the United States. It
provides:
An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plain-
tiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either
before the court having jurisdiction where the carrier is ordinarily resi-
dent, or has his principal place of business, or has an establishment by
which the contract has been made or before the court having juris-
diction at the place of destination.
Rothmans of Pall Mall, Ltd. v. Arabian Airlines, 1981 Q.B. 368 (1980) (italicized
language highlights the difference in translation).
The official text of the Warsaw Convention is in French and, accordingly, the
Convention must be interpreted in accordance with the legal meaning of the
French text. Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 536-37 (1991); Air France v.
Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985). The French version is as follows:
(1) L'action en responsabiliti devra itre portge, au choix du demandeur,
dans le territoire d'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes, soit devant le tri-
bunal du domicile du transporteur, du siege principal de son exploitation
ou du lieu oti il possde un 9tablissement par le soin duquel le contract a t9
conclu, soit devant le tribunal du lieu de destination.
(2) La procidure sera reglie par la loi du tribuanl saisi.
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In reality, there are only three available forum sites, as the domi-
cile of the carrier is almost invariably also its principal place of
business (at least under U.S. law). 2
Some courts, on the other hand, have intimated that it is im-
plied in the Convention that the plaintiffs domicile is one of
the sites listed in the Convention.22 The suggestion follows that,
because the place of destination is usually the plaintiff's domi-
cile, then the plaintiff is, in fact, allowed to bring an action in
his or her domicile.23 As we shall see, however, the forum of the
passenger's domicile did not become an available forum option,
as a matter of right, until the 1999 Montreal Convention.24
Article 28 affords the plaintiff the limited ability of choosing
where initially to bring his or her cause of action. Article 28
does not provide the plaintiff the opportunity to bring the cause
of action in the place where the negligent act or omission oc-
curred, the site of the accident, wherever the airline conducts
commercial activities, or the domicile or residence of the plain-
tiff, unless that place happens also to be one of the four sites
listed in the Convention.
C. "AT THE OPTION OF THE PLAINTIFFS"
To pursue a cause of action under Warsaw, the complaint
must be brought in one of the four designated fora "at the op-
tion of the plaintiff. ' 25 But this clause has never been read to
21 Osborne v. British Airways PLC Corp., 198 F. Supp. 2d 901, 905 (S.D. Tex.
2002). In Wyler v. Korean Airlines Company, Ltd., 928 F.2d 1167 (D.C. 1991), the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit explained that U.S. courts
have interpreted the Article 28(1) phrase du domicile du transporteur as the car-
rier's place of business. The court noted that: "[T] he French definition of'domi-
cie' that would encompass any place of significant business is only relevant for
questions of personal jurisdiction within France." Id. at 1175. French and British
courts differ as to what the principal place of business implies. See Rothmans,
supra note 20.
22 See Coyle, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 1163, 1169.
23 Id. at 1163 ("The Warsaw Convention has been interpreted in a manner that
tends to provide an injured traveler (or the survivors) a forum in the traveler's
home country."); see also Gasca v. Empresa de Transporte Aero Del Peru, 992 F.
Supp. 1377 (S.D. Fla. 1998). Both Coyle and Gasca involved situations where the
passengers, holding round trip tickets from/to the United States, died abroad on
crashes aboard flights that had been purchased abroad as separate side trips. See
James D. MacIntyre, Where Are You Going? Destination, Jurisdiction, and the Warsaw
Convention: Does Passenger Intent Enter the Analysis?, 60J. AIR L. & Com. 657 (1995).
24 Although the forum of the passenger's domicile was first adopted in the
1991 Guatemala City Protocol, that Protocol has not entered into effect and al-
most certainly never will. See Guatamala City Protocol, supra note 7.
25 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 28(1), at 3020.
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give the plaintiff the absolute right to decide which court will
hear the case. The defendant still has the right, to the extent
possible under the law of the forum, to challenge jurisdiction
and/or venue. The clause only gives the plaintiff the limited
ability to determine which court will initially entertain jurisdic-
tion over the case. At first glance, this does not appear signifi-
cant. It is plaintiff's choice of forum, however, that will
determine the procedural law to be applied in determining
whether the cause of action will be dismissed, removed, or trans-
ferred, as Article 28(2) specifically provides that procedural
questions are to be governed by the law of the forum.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the proposi-
tion that the language of Article 28(1), "at the option of the
plaintiff," grants plaintiffs "the absolute and inalterable right to
choose the national forum in which their claims will be liti-
gated. '26 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that the Conven-
tion is not intended to alter a country's forum selection process:
[A] rticle 28(1) offers an injured passenger or his representative
four forums in which a suit for damages may be brought. The
party initiating the action enjoys the prerogative of choosing be-
tween these possible national forums but that selection is not in-
violate. That choice is then subject to the procedural
requirements and devices that are part of that forum's internal
laws. As one commentator on the Convention has stated: "No
evidence can be found anywhere that the drafters of the Conven-
tion intended to alter the judicial system of any country." We
simply do not believe that the United States through adherence
to the Convention has meant to forfeit such a valuable procedu-
ral tool as the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 27
The court concluded that the plaintiffs construction of the
Article would allow American courts to be the forum for litiga-
tion with which they have no connection and which would be
antithetical to the underlying purpose of the Convention of en-
suring that a cause of action is brought in a forum which has an
actual interest in the cause of action. Accordingly, so the court
ruled, although Article 28 provides that the forum is at the "op-
26 In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 821 F.2d
1147, 1161 (5th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. Lopez, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989), cited with approval in Nolan v.
Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1068-69 (5th Cir. 1990) (dismissing on forum non
conveniens grounds more than 100 mostly U.K. plaintiffs to U.K. courts in a non-
Warsaw case).
27 Id. at 1161 (citing Robbins, Jurisdiction Under Article 28 Of The Warsaw Conven-
tion, 9 McGILL L.J. 352, 355 (1963)).
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tion of the plaintiff," it does not mandate that the action must
be heard in the forum first selected by the plaintiff.
I1. SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS AND THE
IATA AGREEMENTS
A. PRE-MONTREAL 1999
As the airline industry matured, the Warsaw Convention
showed signs of aging. The first attempt to give Warsaw a face-
lift was at the Hague in 1955. The Hague Protocol did not
amend Article 28, but it did attempt to raise the limit of liability,
though only to $16,600.2 The United States did not ratify the
Hague Protocol. However, many years later, when the United
States ratified Montreal Protocol No. 4, it was thought then that
such ratification automatically meant that the United States be-
came a party to the Hague Protocol. That no longer seems to
be the case. According to a press release issued by the White
House on July 31, 2002, the United States is now moving for-
ward independently to ratify the Hague Protocol.29
The Guadalajara and Guatamala City Protocols and Montreal
Protocols Numbers 1, 2, and 3 were all subsequent attempts to
modernize Warsaw, but were never ratified by the United
States.3 0 The United States, did, however, ratify Montreal Proto-
col No. 4, which applies only to cargo."
B. THE FIFTH FORUM
The 1971 Guatemala City Protocol was the first of the Warsaw
modifications to adopt the "fifth forum," allowing a plaintiff to
bring a cause of action in the domicile or permanent residence
of the passenger-victim if the airline has a place of business
there.32 Article XII of Guatemala was designed to amend Article
28 as follows:
218 Hague Protocol, supra note 7.
29 Press Release, White House, Message to the Senate of the United States (July
31, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/
20020731-4.html.
30 Montreal Protocols No. 1 and No. 2 have fewer than 50 contracting parties
to date. Montreal No. 3 has 23 contracting parties to date. See ICAO Treaty Col-
lection, at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb (last visited Jan. 26, 2003).
31 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
32 Jukka Heinonen, The Warsaw Convention Jurisdiction and the Internet, 65J. AIR
L. & COM. 453, 456 (2000). Allowing victims or their survivors to sue in the
courts of their domiciles had its genesis in maritime law where it seems first to
have appeared in Article 13(c) of the 1967 Brussels Maritime Convention on Lug-
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In respect of damage resulting from the death, injury or delay of
a passenger or the destruction, loss, damage or delay of baggage,
the action may be brought before one of the Courts mentioned
in paragraph 1 of this Article [referring to Article 28(1)], or in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, before the
Court within the jurisdiction of which the carrier has an estab-
lishment if the passenger has his domicile or permanent resi-
dence in the territory of the same High Contracting Party.33
Only Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic,
Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Nigeria, Seychelles, and Togo have
ratified this Protocol. The United States has not. The Protocol
has not entered into effect and, in light of Montreal 1999, al-
most certainly never will.
Because the United States and many other nations had failed
to ratify the Guatemala and Montreal Protocols and were also
dissatisfied with the liability limits, the International Air Trans-
port Association (IATA) in 1996 sought to obtain agreements
from its member carriers to update the limits of IATA's earlier
Intercarrier Agreement of 1966 (which provided for limits of
US$75,000) and to allow passenger victims or their survivors to
enjoy unlimited recoveries based on and determined by the law
of their domiciles. 4 The 1996 IATA Agreements consist of the
IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability (IIA) and
the IATA Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Inter-
gage Liability. See International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to Carriage of Passenger Luggage at Sea, Brussels, May 27, 1967, 1967
I.M.C.O., art. 13(1)(c). It next appeared in the amended Article 28(2) of the
1971 Guatemala City Protocol. It was later also adopted in Article 17(1) (c) of the
1974 Athens Maritime Convention on Passenger Liability. SeeAthens Convention
Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea, Dec. 31, 1974,
1975 I.M.C.O. 19, art. 17(1).
33 Guatamala City Protocol, supra note 6, at 615.
34 See Weigand, supra note 9, at 907. In November 1965, the U.S. gave notice
of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention in large part because of the low limits
of liability for personal injury and death. In response, IATA brought about an
agreement among a majority of U.S. and foreign international air carriers flying
into the U.S. to increase the limits of liability to $75,000 inclusive of legal fees or
$58,000 exclusive of legal fees for death or bodily injuries. The parties also waived
their Article 20(1) defense and accepted absolute liability, i.e., liability without
proof of fault. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 40105 Historical and Statutory Notes. The 1996
IATA Agreements had two tiers-the first: absolute liability with the limit capped
at approximately $130,000 (i.e., 100,000 SDRs); and the second: unlimited liabil-
ity but with the carrier's Article 20(1) defense restored.
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carrier Agreement (MIA)." Paragraph 1 of the IIA describes its
purpose as replacing the Warsaw Convention's liability cap with
the damage model of the passenger's domicile:
To take action to waive the limitation of liability on recoverable
compensatory damages in Article 22 paragraph 1 of the Warsaw
Convention as to claims for death, wounding or other bodily in-
jury of a passenger within the meaning of Article 17 of the Con-
vention, so that recoverable compensatory damages may be
determined and awarded by reference to the law of the domicile
of the passenger.3 6
The Explanatory Note to the Agreement states that: "Such
waiver by a carrier may be made conditional on the law of the
domicile of the passenger governing the calculation of the re-
coverable compensatory damages under the Intercarrier Agree-
ment. But this is an option.3 7
The 1996 IATA Agreements thus gave plaintiffs and carriers
the ability to reference the law of the victim's domicile, but did
not allow plaintiffs to bring their causes of action in their domi-
ciles unless, of course, the domicile happened to be one of the
four fora listed in Article 28. Because the 1996 IATA Agree-
ments did not specifically provide for a fifth forum, the U.S. De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) delayed approving them. 8
In the DOT's Order relating to the Agreements, DOT condi-
tioned its approval upon inclusion of the fifth forum provision
for all "operations to, from, or with a connection or stopping
place in the United States." 9
C. MONTREAL 1999
Although most international carriers were bound by the 1996
IATA Agreements, they were merely intercarrier contractual ar-
rangements and were neither "public law" nor international
35 Matthew R. Pickelman, Draft Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for
International Carriage by Air: the Warsaw Convention Revisited for the Last Time?, 64J.
AIR L. & CoM. 273, 289 (1998).
36 IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability, available at http://
www.iata.org/legal (last visited Jan. 26, 2003).
37 Id.
38 Blanca I. Rodriguez, Recent Developments in Aviation Liability Law, 66J. AIR L.
& COM. 21, 33 (2000).
39 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention, De-
partment of Transportation, Order 96-11-6, available at http://dms.dot.gov/gen-
eral/orders/19964qtr/961106.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). The DOT
approved the Agreements in January 1997. The European Commission approved
them in February 1997, and IATA declared them in effect on February 14, 1997.
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treaties. As a result, the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO) continued to work towards a new Warsaw system
and, following many preliminary efforts, submitted a draft con-
vention before a Diplomatic Conference held in Montreal in
May 1999.40 On May 28, 1999, representatives from over fifty
countries, including the United States, approved a new Conven-
tion for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Car-
riage by Air, colloquially known as "Montreal 1999."
During the negotiations, the U.S. Government "insisted upon
the addition of the 'fifth forum,"' 4 allowing a passenger to
bring a cause of action in that passenger's principal place of res-
idence if the defendant has a place of business there. On sub-
mittal to Congress on September 6, 2000, then President
Clinton explained the benefits of adopting the Montreal
Convention:
Upon entry into force for the United States, the Convention,
where applicable, would supersede the Warsaw Convention, as
amended by the Protocol to Amend the Warsaw Convention,
done at Montreal September 25, 1975 ("Montreal Protocol No.
4"), which entered into force for the United States on March 4,
1999. The Convention represents a vast improvement over the
liability regime established under the Warsaw Convention and its
related instruments, relative to passenger rights in the event of
an accident. Among other benefits, the Convention eliminates
the cap on carrier liability to accident victims; holds carriers
strictly liable for proven damages up to 100,000 Special Drawing
Rights (approximately $135,000) (Special Drawing Rights re-
present an artificial "basket" currency developed by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund for internal accounting purposes to
replace gold as a world standard); provides for U.S. jurisdiction for
most claims brought on behalf of U.S. passengers; clarifies the duties
and obligations of carriers engaged in code-share operations;
and, with respect to cargo, preserves all of the significant ad-
vances achieved by Montreal Protocol No. 4.42
The United States has not yet ratified Montreal 1999, but is in
the process of doing so. It will not come into force until thirty
states have ratified; currently 25 have done so. 43
40 See Weigand, supra note 9, at 908; J.C. Batra, Modernization of the Warsaw
System-Montreal 1999, 65J. AIR L. & COM. 429, 433 (2000).
41 See Rodriguez, supra note 38, at 33.
42 Removal of Injunction of Secrecy-Treaty Document No. 106-45, 146 Cong.
Rec. S8125-04, 2000 WL 1258578 (Cong.Rec.) (emphasis added).
43 See ICAO Treaty Collection, supra note 30. The 25 nations that have so far
ratified Montreal 1999 are: Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Canada, Cyprus,
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IV. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
The doctrine of forum non conveniens (FNC) is designed to
prevent plaintiffs from choosing an inconvenient forum that
may "'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' the defendant by inflicting
upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to
pursue his remedy."44 The doctrine, originally appearing in
Scottish law, entered into reasonably common usage in the
United States in the 1920s.45 When the more convenient forum
is in another federal jurisdiction, the case may be transferred
under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404, which is in effect the codified version
of FNC, allowing the transfer from one federal court to a more
convenient federal court. But when the more convenient forum
is a foreign jurisdiction, the case is not within the purview of
§ 1404 (or § 1406), but may still be dismissed under the com-
mon law doctrine of forum non conveniens.4 6
The purpose of forum non conveniens is to provide a court
with authority to transfer cases to a foreign forum pursuant to
"the court's inherent power, under Article III of the Constitu-
tion, to control the administration of the litigation before it and
to prevent its process from becoming an instrument of abuse,
injustice, or oppression."" 7 But although a court has the inher-
ent power to transfer actions under forum non conveniens,
"[t]he central purpose of a forum non conveniens inquiry is to
determine where trial will be most convenient and will serve the
ends of justice. 48
There are two seminal Supreme Court cases that have shaped
the modern analysis of foreign non conveniens: Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert9 and Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.5' Gilbert involved a transfer
Czech Republic, Greece, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Mexico, Namibia, New
Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Syrian Arab Re-
public, United Arab Emirates, and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
44 15 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE § 3828 (2d ed. 1987).
45 Gordon E. Maag, Forum Non Conveniens in Illinois: a Historical Review, Critical
Analysis, And Proposal For Change, 25 S. ILL. U. LJ. 461, 463 (2001).
46 WRIGHT, supra note 44, § 3828. Although technically, a case may be dis-
missed following a successful FNC motion, the case is usually dismissed condi-
tioned upon suit being filed in, and the defendant subjecting itself to, the
jurisdiction of the foreign court to which the FNC transfer is requested. See infra
note 81. It is thus, in effect, a transfer of the case.
47 Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824 (quoting In re Air Crash
Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 821 F.2d 1147, 1161 (5th Cir.
1987) and Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 530 (1947)).
48 R. Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chem. Co., 942 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1991).
49 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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between federal courts while Reyno involved a transfer from a
federal court to a court abroad.
A. GULF OIL CORP. V. GILBERT
In Gilbert, a Virginia resident filed suit in the District Court for
the Southern District of New York. As a result of a fire occur-
ring in plaintiff's Virginia warehouse, plaintiff filed suit against a
Pennsylvania corporation licensed to do business in Virginia and
New York. The defendant filed an FNC motion to dismiss, alleg-
ing that the proper venue was Virginia, where the plaintiff and
the witnesses reside, where the defendant does business, and
where the accident in question occurred. The district Court dis-
missed the case based upon FNC, but the court of appeals
reversed.
Reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that
when an FNC argument is made "it presupposes at least two fo-
rums in which the defendant is amenable to process; the doc-
trine furnishes the criteria for choice between them."' 5' In
examining the case, the Supreme Court created a multi faceted
test-which has since been extensively applied-first addressing
whether an adequate alternate forum exists and then balancing
or weighing private and public interests to determine whether a
transfer is proper. The Court noted, however, that "unless the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. 5
2
In examining the private interests of the litigants, the Court
considered the following factors:
1. the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
2. the availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling witnesses;
3. the costs of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses;
4. the possibility of viewing the premises, if appropriate; and
5. all other factors which would make the trial easy, expedi-
tious, and inexpensive.
The Court next turned to the public interest and considered
these additional factors:
1. administrative difficulties with congested dockets;
50 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
5. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 506-07.
52 Id. at 508.
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2. jury duty as a burden that should not be imposed upon a
community which has no relation to the litigation;
3. local interest in having local controversies decided locally;
and
4. conflicts of law questions and foreign law should not be
forced upon a non local court where the local court could
apply its own laws.53
The Court noted specifically that the plaintiff was not a resi-
dent of New York nor was any witness, nor did any event con-
nected with the cause of action occur there. Every person who
participated in the allegedly negligent acts and other witnesses,
with the exception of potential expert witnesses, resided in Vir-
ginia. The Court faulted the plaintiff for arguing that the forum
was not inconvenient instead of asserting that it served any
convenience.5 4
In reversing the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court held that
the district court did not exceed its powers in dismissing the
complaint and "remitting [it] to the courts of [Gilbert's] own
community. '55 The central focus of the Court's analysis was con-
venience: it was more convenient to hold the trial where the
plaintiffs business was located than in a forum which technically
was available but which did not have any significant interest in
the litigation-even if it provided to the plaintiff more favorable
laws and a more favorable opportunity for an enhanced mone-
tary recovery.
B. PIPER AIRCRAFT Co. v. REYNO
Thirty-four years later, the Supreme Court reexamined its ap-
proach in Gilbert and decided to go on to the next logical and
very desirable step. In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, after an air-
plane crashed in Scotland, the estates of the Scottish citizens
who died in the accident brought wrongful-death actions against
Piper Aircraft Co. (Piper) and Hartzell Propeller, Inc. (Hartzell)
in a California state court.56 All the deceased victims were Scot-
tish nationals. Piper manufactured the plane in Pennsylvania.
Hartzell manufactured the propeller in Ohio. The plane was
53 Id. at 509-11.
54 Id at 511. The Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that "an action of this
type, involving, as it does, a claim for damages in an amount close to $400,000, is
one which may stagger the imagination of a local jury [in Virginia] which is surely
unaccustomed to dealing with amounts of such a nature." Id. at 510.
55 Id. at 512.
-56 Reyno, 454 U.S. at 235.
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owned by Air Navigation and Trading, Co., Ltd, registered in
Great Britain, and operated by McDonald Aviation, Ltd., a Scot-
tish air taxi service. The plaintiff acknowledged that the action
was filed in the United States because U.S. laws are more
favorable on liability, capacity to sue, and damages.
On defendants' motions, the action was first removed to a fed-
eral district court in California and then transferred to the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Penn-
sylvania. Defendants next moved to dismiss the action on forum
non conveniens grounds. The district court granted their mo-
tion, but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed,
holding that dismissal is barred when the law of the alternative
forum is less favorable to the plaintiff than the law of the chosen
forum.
Reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that
"[t]he possibility of a change in substantive law should ordina-
rily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the
forum non conveniens inquiry. ' 57 The Court further reasoned
that "Gilbert implicitly recognized that dismissal may not be
barred solely because of the possibility of an unfavorable change
in law."' 58 Moreover, creating a contrary standard would require
courts to apply the law of the alternative forum to determine
which law is more favorable. This is antithetical to the purpose
of the FNC doctrine, which is designed to "help courts avoid
conducting complex exercises in comparative law."'59 American
courts would then become even more attractive to foreign plain-
tiffs, so the Court reasoned, as the American court would not
dismiss the case unless the foreign jurisdiction's laws were not
less favorable to the plaintiff, thus causing even more conges-
tion in U.S. courts.
57 Id. at 247.
58 Id. at 249. The Court further commented on why favorability of the law is
not considered:
[I]f conclusive or substantial weight were given to the possibility of
a change in law, the forum non conveniens doctrine would become
virtually useless ... plaintiffs will select that forum whose choice of
law rules are most advantageous. Thus, if the possibility of an unfa-
vorable change in substantive law is given substantial weight in the
forum non conveniens inquiry, dismissal would rarely be proper.
Id. at 250; see also id. at 255 ("Although the relatives of the decedent may not be
able to rely on a strict liability theory, and although their potential damages
award may be smaller, there is no danger that they will be deprived of any remedy
or treated unfairly [in the Scottish courts].").
59 Id. at 251.
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The Court also held that "under Gilbert, dismissal will ordina-
rily be appropriate where trial in the plaintiffs chosen forum
imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the court, and
where the plaintiff is unable to offer any specific reasons of con-
venience supporting his choice. 6 ° It discredited the court of
appeals' view that more, let alone that decisive, weight should be
given to the plaintiff's choice of forum. And perhaps most im-
portantly, it credited the district court's reasoning that the pre-
sumption that might normally apply to a plaintiff's choice of
forum "applies with less force when the plaintiff or real parties
in interest are foreign."'" The Court explained the difference in
convenience for domestic and foreign plaintiffs:
The District Court's distinction between resident or citizen plain-
tiffs and foreign plaintiffs is fully justified. In Koster [v. Lumber-
mens Mutual Casualty Co.], the Court indicates that a plaintiffs
choice of forum is entitled to greater deference when the plain-
tiff has chosen the home forum. When the home forum has
been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is conve-
nient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is
much less reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forum
non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a
foreign plaintiffs choice deserves less deference.6 2
The Court concluded that the district court was not unreason-
able in finding that there would be fewer evidentiary problems if
the trial were in Scotland. Finally, so the Court held, "[f]inding
that trial in the plaintiffs chosen forum would be burden-
some ... is sufficient to support dismissal on the grounds of
forum non conveniens."63 The Supreme Court thus reversed
the court of appeals, dismissed the action on FNC grounds, and
established the relevant and still prevailing principles for apply-
ing the FNC doctrine.64
V. INTERACTION OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE, AND
NAVIGATION TREATIES
The United States has systematically entered into numerous
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) treaties, or their
60 Id. at 249.
61 Id. at 255.
62 Id. at 255-56 (citing Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524
(1947)).
63 Id. at 268.
64 Id. at 259-60.
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equivalent, in past years." The standard treaty language pro-
vides that:
Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded na-
tional treatment with respect to access to the courts ofjustice and
to administrative tribunals and agencies within the territories of
the other Party, in all degrees ofjurisdiction, both in pursuit and
in defense of their rights.66
The comparable provision in the U.S.-Belgium treaty states:
To this end they shall in particular have right of access, on the
same basis and on the same conditions as nationals of such other
Party, to the courts of justice and administrative tribunals and
agencies in all degrees of jurisdiction and shall have right to the
services of competent persons of their choice.67
These treaties, in short, accord citizens of the foreign nation
signatories national treatment in equal access to American
courts.68 If the Warsaw Convention plaintiff is a citizen of a na-
tion that has an FCN or comparable treaty with the United
States providing for equal access to United States courts, then
the foreign plaintiff must presumptively be treated in the same
manner as the typical United States citizen, including requiring
the forum non conveniens standards to be applied under much
the same standards as would be applied to American citizens.
One of the first cases presenting such facts was Irish National
Insurance Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta.69 In that case, Aer Lingus
transported a carton containing integrated circuits from Ireland
to New York. On arrival at New York, the container was dam-
aged. Though all parties involved were Irish corporations, the
65 See, e.g., Belgium Treaty and Protocol, signed at Brussels Feb. 21, 1961, en-
tered into force Oct. 3, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432; Luxembourg
Treaty and Protocol, signed at Luxembourg Feb. 23, 1962, entered into force
Mar. 28, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 251, T.I.A.S. No. 5306; Ireland Treaty and Protocol,
signed at Dublin Jan. 21, 1950, entered into force Sept. 14, 1950, 1 U.S.T. 785,
T.I.A.S. No. 2155. Similar treaties have been entered with Denmark, Pakistan,
Nicaragua, the Netherlands, Korea, Germany, Greece, Israel,Japan, Italy, Poland,
and others. See also Allan Jay Stevenson, Forum Non Conveniens and Equal Access
under Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties: A Foreign Plaintiffs Rights, 13
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. Rrv. 267 (1990).
66 Federal Republic of Germany Treaty and Protocol, signed at Washington,
D.C. Oct. 29, 1954, entered into force July 14, 1956, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No.
3593.
67 Belgium Treaty and Protocol, signed at Brussels Feb. 21, 1961, entered into
force Oct. 3, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432.
68 See Blanco v. Banco Industrial De Venezuela, 997 F.2d 974, 981 (2d Cir.
1993).
69 Irish Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1984).
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plaintiff filed the action in the Eastern District of New York ap-
parently to avail itself of the more favorable United States law.
The district court analyzed the facts based upon Gilbert's private
and public interest factors and noted that "most of the signifi-
cant sources of proof in this case are located in Ireland. ' 70 The
plaintiff argued that the court had an interest in protecting
those with a property interest in shipments delivered at Kennedy
Airport. The district court concluded, however, that plaintiff's
real purpose for bringing the action in New York was "to avoid
the possibility that application of Irish law will result in a smaller
recovery for plaintiff" and dismissed the case on forum non con-
veniens grounds.71
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that under the terms of a
treaty between Ireland and the United States, citizens of Ireland
were entitled to the same treatment and rights as United States
citizens. The court further held that because the "district court
should have applied the same forum non conveniens standards
that it would have applied to a United States citizen . . . [and]
failed to do so, . . . this failure tainted its entire holding. '7 2 Al-
ternatively, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district court's
findings of fact based upon the relevant interest analysis and
more (or less) also concluded that a weighing of the public and
private interest factors did not favor dismissal to Ireland.
In reaching its conclusion with respect to the impact of the
FCN treaty, the Second Circuit arguably failed to appreciate that
the specific language of these treaties requires that foreigners
enjoy little more than "equal access" to United States courts.
The Irish plaintiff was clearly given equal access and was then
subject to the same Gilbert factors as would have been applied to
a U.S. citizen. Just as the Gilbert plaintiff was sent back to Vir-
ginia, so too the Irish plaintiff, under the Gilbert factors, could
have been sent back to Ireland. To be sure, the Second Circuit
also disagreed with the district court's weighing of the Gilbert
factors, which was presumably the principal reason for the
reversal.
70 Irish Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, No. CV-83-0305, 1984 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20690, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 1984).
71 Id. at *5. The court noted that Aer Lingus indicated that, on transfer to an
Irish court, Aer Lingus would not contest personal jurisdiction or assert any stat-
ute of limitations defense. The court observed, however, that were Aer Lingus to
do so, the court would allow the action to be reinstated in the district court.
72 Irish Nat'l Ins. Co., 739 F.2d at 92; see Ireland Treaty and Protocol, signed at
Dublin Jan. 21, 1950, U.S.-Ire., 1 U.S.T. 785.
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Since Aer Lingus, there have been other cases involving the
issue of the impact of an FNC treaty on the "right" of foreigners
to bring suit in a U.S. forum and-as the foreign plaintiffs usu-
ally argue-to be free from the possible application of the fo-
rum non conveniens doctrine returning them to the forum of
their domicile (notwithstanding that most, if not all, of the prin-
cipal contacts in the case point to that foreign forum).7 They
have generally reached conclusions different than that reached
in Aer Lingus.
In Jennings v. Boeing Co., the surviving Irish spouse of an Irish
victim of a helicopter crash in the North Sea brought suit
against the manufacturer in Pennsylvania, seeking punitive dam-
ages and arguing that, under the U.S.-Ireland FCN treaty, a for-
eign plaintiff had as much right as an American to benefit from
the more favorable substantive law and damage determinations
in U.S. courts. 74 Facing the issues "squarely," the Pennsylvania
district court observed that it was not a matter of convenience
for the Irish widow to sue in the United States; rather she filed
here simply because, given the "availability of [Pennsylvania's]
strict liability theories, more liberal measure of damages, and
the possible right to punitive damages" the Pennsylvania forum
was clearly "a more attractive forum for her. ' 75 Likewise, as the
court added, the defendant invokes FNC because "it believes
that any ultimate recovery in these courts [of England or Scot-
land] is likely to be less than in this court. "76
Invoking the Reyno principle that an FNC motion may not be
denied merely because the law in the transferee forum is "less
favorable to the plaintiffs," the district court concluded that: "As
an Irish citizen, [the widow] is entitled to the same rights of
recovery afforded to any citizen of a State of the Union, other
than Pennsylvania, who files [any] action in this federal district
73 See, e.g., Blanco v. Banco Industrial De Venezuela, 997 F.2d 974, 981 (2d Cir.
1993) (noting the presence of the U.S.-Venezuela FCN treaty and, accordingly,
imposing no "discount" on the Venezuelan plaintiffs' choice of a New York fo-
rum, but nonetheless dismissing on FNC grounds based on the Gilbert factors);
Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1978) (upholding an
FNC dismissal of a suit by an Iranian national despite an equal access clause in an
FCN treaty); see also In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India
v. Union Carbide Corp., 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
74 Jennings v. Boeing Co., 660 F. Supp. 796 (E. D. Pa. 1987).
75 Id. at 799.
76 Id.
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court.""v In other words, to the extent that "an American non-
resident of Pennsylvania" might be subject to being dismissed or
transferred to another court on FNC grounds, so too is an Irish
plaintiff or any other foreign plaintiff, whether benefiting or not
from an FCN treaty.78
Following a judicious weighing of Gilbert's public and private
interest factors, the court found that, because the Gilbert factors
"overwhelming favor dismissal," the court need not resolve the
issue whether the presumption favoring a plaintiffs choice of
forum must, under the applicable FCN treaty, be applied to
Irish citizens as if they were U.S. citizens.79 The court then con-
tinued its discussion of this issue in a footnote, which observed
that:
Where a plaintiff brings suit in a forum far distant from his or
her home, be that home in a foreign nation or in a distant state
of the United States, it is reasonable to infer that the plaintiffs
choice of forum was based on factors other than the plaintiffs
own convenience. Thus, as a practical matter, the presumptive
appropriateness of a plaintiffs choice should be diminished
where the plaintiff brings suit in a distant forum, and in this re-
spect foreign and United States plaintiffs should be treated
alike.80
The court thus concluded that dismissal on FNC grounds "is
appropriate under conditions that will be imposed."81
77 Id. at 800. In referring to "rights of recovery," it is likely, given the result of
the case, that the court was in fact thinking more in terms of "right to bring suit,"
i.e., right of access.
78 Id. The court further concluded:
But equally, to the extent that the court may consider and dismiss a
case for forum non conveniens as to an American non-resident of
Pennsylvania who files an action in Pennsylvania, so may it dismiss
an action as to an Irish citizen. The Treaty provides for similar
treatment in like situations; clearly it affords Irish citizens no
greater rights than those afforded to United States citizens. There-
fore, if a diversity action filed by an American citizen may be dis-
missed even though such a dismissal might result in the loss of a
potential punitive damages award, so may such an action be dis-
missed when filed by an Irish citizen entitled to national treatment
under the Treaty.
Id.
79 Id. at 804.
80 Id. at 804 n. 10.
81 Id. at 809. The "conditions" imposed by the court are those normally im-
posed when, as here, a case is dismissed on FNC grounds with the prospect that it
will thereafter be filed in a foreign court. Defendant must:
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Moving from foreign plaintiffs to U.S. non-resident plaintiffs,
a recent Second Circuit decision, Iragorri v. Otis Elevator, held
that merely because a U.S. citizen sues in a court (in Connecti-
cut) other than that of his residence (Florida) does not ipsofacto
deprive him of the benefit of the presumption that normally at-
tends a plaintiffs choice of forum. 2 While not involving either
a foreign plaintiff or an FCN treaty, the court indicated that it
was "mindful" of the possible impact of its decision in such a
context. The accident giving rise to the complaint occurred in
Cali, Colombia, where the victim-though a U.S. citizen-was
residing at the time. Were no presumption to attend a plain-
tiffs choice of forum in a state other than that of his residence,
FNC could have been applied in Iragorri, leaving plaintiffs to re-
instate their suit in Colombia. But the Second Circuit con-
cluded that it would be wrong not to apply the presumption
when, as was the fact in that case, the plaintiff was not only a
U.S. citizen, but chose the Connecticut forum not for tactical
reasons but because he was able to obtain jurisdiction over all
three defendants only in Connecticut and could not have done
so in Florida On the other hand, so the court concluded, where
a foreign plaintiff chooses a U.S. forum:
[A] plausible likelihood exists that the selection was made for
forum shopping reasons, such as the perception that United
States courts award higher damages than are common in other
countries. Even if the U.S. district was not chosen for such fo-
rum-shopping reasons, there is nonetheless little reason to as-
sume that it is convenient for a foreign plaintiff.8 3
While the Gilbert factors (including the jurisdictional twist of
Iragorri) will thus apply to both foreigners and U.S. citizens, the
(1) submit itself to the jurisdiction of the English or Scottish courts
for all purposes relevant to this cause of action; (2) waive any stat-
ute of limitations defense in any action filed in those courts by the
plaintiff within one year from this date; (3) not contest its liability
for compensatory damages; (4) provide plaintiff access to all rele-
vant evidence in its custody and control located in the United states
or elsewhere regarding issues of liability and/or damages including
punitive damages in the event that such issues are appropriately
raised in the plaintiffs subsequent action; and (5) pay any final
judgment for damages, costs or attorney's fees of any kind awarded
in the British or Scottish courts in the plaintiffs subsequent action
(subject to any rights of appeal).
Id.
82 Iragorri v. Otis Elevator, 274 F. 3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001).
83 Id at 71.
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strength of ties to the U.S. forum will be significantly greater for
an American citizen or resident than for a foreigner.8 4
VI. INTERACTION BETWEEN ARTICLE 28 JURISDICTION
AND THE FORUM NON CONVENIENS DOCTRINE
Although Article 28 allows the plaintiff, at his or her option,
to choose the initial forum within the realm of the allowable
three (or four) Article 28 sites, it does not-or, at least, did not
until Hosaka-preclude the defendant from then questioning
the choice of forum and moving to apply the rules of that forum
to dismiss or transfer the action. In short, it was generally as-
sumed, before Hosaka, that FNC was available under Article
28(2) as a procedural tool to try to defeat the increasing resort
to U.S. courts by foreigners in aviation crash cases.8 5
In In re Air Crash off Long Island New York, on July 17, 1996,6
the Southern District, while affirming the applicability of the
FNC doctrine in a Warsaw Convention context, may well have
laid the groundwork for effectively precluding forum non con-
veniens dismissals even when the plaintiffs are all foreign nation-
als. On July 17, 1996, TWA Flight 800 took off from John F.
Kennedy International Airport in New York destined for Paris.
Minutes later, it crashed off the shore of Long Island with no
survivors. At least 45 of the plaintiffs were French citizens, who
filed an action against Boeing and TWA, seeking punitive, pre-
death pain and suffering, and compensatory damages. At a later
point in the litigation, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss
84 See also WIWA v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000)
(according deference to plaintiffs' choice where two of the plaintiffs, though not
U.S. citizens, were lawful U.S. residents, though not of the southern district of
New York. The suit, however, was brought under the Torture Victim Protection
Act, which, the court noted, "expressed a policy of U.S. law favoring the adjudica-
tion of such suits in U.S. courts."); Wesoke v. Contract Serv. Ltd., No. 00 Civ. 1188
(CBM), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12832 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2002) (according defer-
ence to selection of New York forum by U.S. citizen-resident of Florida where
selection was to obtain personal jurisdiction over European defendants).
85 See supra note 26; see also Chukwu v. Air France, 218 F. Supp. 2d 979 (N.D.
Ill. 2002) (holding that forum non conveniens is available in a Warsaw Conven-
tion case, but concluding that there was not sufficient proof that Nigeria was an
adequate alternative forum or that the public and private interest factors favor
dismissal); In re Air Crash Disaster of Aviateca Flight 901 Near San Salvador, El
Salvador on August 9, 1995 (29 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 1997); In reAir
Disaster at Riyadh Airport, Saudi Arabia, on August 19, 1990, 540 F. Supp. 1141
(D.D.C. 1982); infra note 130 and accompanying text.




the French plaintiffs based on forum non conveniens grounds,
arguing that damages should be determined by a French court,
and agreeing that if the actions were transferred to a French
court, they would consent:
(1) ... to the jurisdiction of the courts of France for trial; (2) not
to contest liability for full compensatory damages in the courts of
France to any plaintiff or beneficiary who, under the applicable
law, suffered a compensable injury as a proximate result of the
accident and promptly to try such damages if the claim cannot be
settled; (3) to promptly pay any damages awarded by the courts
of France, subject to any right to appeal in that forum; and (4) to
treat as tolled any statute of limitations under French law for any
plaintiff or named beneficiary in a pending U.S. Flight 800 ac-
tion, provided that the proceedings are commenced in France
within 120 days of forum non conveniens dismissal."7
A. THE GILBERT TEST: ADEQUATE ALTERNATIVE FORUM
The district court applied the Gilbert test of determining if
there is an adequate alternative forum and then balanced the
public and private interests. Because the defendants agreed to
subject themselves to the jurisdiction of France if the action
were transferred there, the defendants would be subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction and service of process in the alterative forum.
The plaintiffs, however, argued that France was not an adequate
forum because: the defendants had not shown that the action
could have originally been brought in France (under Warsaw
Article 28); forum non conveniens is not available when plain-
tiffs bring suit under the Warsaw Convention; and the defend-
ants had not shown that France would accept a waiver of the
statute of limitations of Article 29.
The court found that France would be a proper and adequate
forum."8 In addressing the plaintiffs' first contention, i.e.,
whether the action could have originally been brought in
France, the court held that, although Article 28 provides the
fora in which a plaintiff may bring a cause of action, it does not
limit the fora to which a court may transfer a case. The court
then acknowledged that, while the case involves a request for a
87 Id. at 210; see supra note 81.
88 In re Air Crash off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d. at 215. Although not specifi-
cally addressed by the district court, the Second Circuit has held that "it is not
the business of our courts to assume the responsibility for supervising the integ-
rity of the judicial system of another sovereign nation." Chesley v. Union Carbide
Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 66 (2nd Cir. 1991).
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dismissal, the court has the authority to condition the dismissal
on the subsequent acceptance of jurisdiction by the foreign fo-
rum.89 The court also held that Article 28(1) must be read in
conjunction with Article 28(2). Because forum non conveniens
is a procedural tool available to U.S. courts, and because Article
28(2) provides that questions of procedure are to be governed
by the law of the court where the case is brought, forum non
conveniens is applicable to Warsaw Convention cases.90 The
court concluded that: the plaintiffs had satisfied the statute of
limitations by filing a cause of action in the U.S.; the defend-
ants' waiver of the statute of limitations defense would enable a
French court to hear the case; and the court could condition its
dismissal on the French court's acceptance of the action.91 Ac-
cordingly, France was an adequate alternative forum.
Nevertheless, in the almost unique fashion in which it then
applied and weighed Gilbert's public and private interest factors,
the district court denied FNC and held that dismissal was not
warranted.
B. THE PRIVATE INTEREST FACTORS
The court determined that the following private interest fac-
tors were all a "wash."92
1. The Relative Ease of Access to Sources of Proof
In addressing the relative ease of access to sources of proof,
the district court held that there was not "a sufficient basis upon
which to determine whether the ease of access to sources of
proof in a trial for damages-even one in which Defendants do
not contest liability for compensatory damages-favors dismis-
sal."' 93 In so holding, however, the district court found "[a]s to
damages, it is well-established that ease of access to proof of loss
in the jurisdiction where decedent was domiciled weighs heavily
in favor of dismissal. 9 4 The district court further found that "it
is likely that most of the evidence as to compensatory damages is
located in France."95 The court also noted that although some
of the plaintiffs indicated that some compensatory damages evi-
89 In re Air Crash off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 213; see also supra note 81.
90 Id. at 214.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 216.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 215-16.
95 Id.
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dence was located in the United States, it would be outweighed
by evidence in France. 96 The court itself thus provided a more
than "sufficient basis" upon which to conclude that access to
sources of proof definitively favored dismissal.97
The court should also have addressed the fact that, in deter-
mining the amount of damages a plaintiff should receive, it is
most appropriate-as the 1996 IATA Agreements so provide-
to apply the law of the victim's domicile. Unless the case were
transferred, it is entirely possible that laws regarding lost wages,
social security, pension benefits, insurance and other damage
issues relating to the French plaintiffs would be decided by a
United States jury under U.S. law simply because of an inade-
quate understanding of French law on these arcane issues.
Moreover, if the court decided that French law should apply as
to these issues, the task of translation and comprehension for
the court and jury could be daunting.
The district court determined that "evidence as to punitive
damages and pain and suffering before death is far more likely
to be located in the United States. '98 The court thus addressed
the difference in substantive law between the United States and
France. Yet, one of the principal purposes of the FNC doctrine
is to "help courts avoid conducting complex exercises in com-
parative law."99 Nonetheless, the Court did so and then ac-
knowledged evidentiary problems with awarding damages in
France:
[T] here are open questions... as to the availability of such dam-
ages in the French Actions, whether the Actions are tried in the
United States or in France. France, apparently does not allow
punitive damages. In certain circumstances, however, France al-
legedly includes within an award of compensatory damages a
component of "moral damages," for which consideration of the
degree of Defendants' liability or culpability may require evi-
dence likely to exist only in the United States. Moreover, the
volume of evidentiary materials generated by an inquiry into
96 Id.
97 See Alfadda v. Fenn, 159 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the fact that
"nearly all the documentary evidence" was located in France and that "the cost
for witnesses to attend trial will be significantly lessened if trial is held in France"
are significant factors in granting an FNC dismissal).
98 In re Air Crash off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
99 Piper Aircraft Co v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251 (1981); see supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
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moral damages may be quite large-possibly enough to outweigh
materials concerning "pure" compensatory damages 00
Even crediting the Court's "guesstimate" that the quantity of
evidence regarding "moral damages" might outweigh the evi-
dence regarding compensatory damages, it was, after all, the de-
fendants who had requested the transfer even if the evidence of
"moral damages" might prove to be overwhelming. Moreover,
other courts have held that it is not the "number of witnesses or
quantity of evidence" that necessarily counts, but the "material-
ity and importance" of evidence plus its "accessibility and conve-
nience to the forum."' 0 ' If the only issue in a case is that of
damages, then the relative ease of access to sources of proof
should surely be in the place of the plaintiffs residence. As the
Supreme Court explained in Reyno, the relative ease of access to
sources of proof is in effect a nonissue if the defendant does not
contest liability.
2. The Availability of Compulsory Process for Attendance of
Unwilling Witnesses and the Costs of Obtaining Attendance
of Willing Witnesses
The court did not specifically address the availability of com-
pulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses and the
costs of obtaining attendance of willing witness. But for the
same reasons as those discussed under its relative ease of access
to proof analysis, the court held that it was not possible to deter-
mine whether the "witness" factor favored dismissal.1
0 2
The court clearly erred in this analysis. The testimony of per-
sons who knew the decedents would be highly relevant in deter-
mining damages.' Witnesses as well as experts who could best
form a basis for determining damages would almost surely all be
located in the plaintiffs domicile; and it would obviously be
more convenient to effectuate service and obtain evidence there
on these issues. Indeed, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a
federal court even to serve or compel the attendance or testi-
mony of foreign witnesses "who live and work on another conti-
100 In re Air Crash off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
10 Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) ( products
liability suit by New Zealand victims of air crash in New Zealand dismissed on
FNC grounds where New Zealand's administrative remedy was found to be ade-
quate and "evidence relating to Plaintiff's injuries, medical expenses and loss of
earnings... are all in New Zealand").
102 In re Air Crash off Long Island New York, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
103 See Pain v. United Techs. Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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nent.'' 4 In any event, the costs of obtaining the attendance of
such witnesses by any compulsory process would be considerably
less in the plaintiffs domicile.
3. The Possibility of Viewing the Premises, If Appropriate
The court acknowledged that given the nature of the acci-
dent, viewing the scene of the accident would not add any rele-
vant evidence. 10 5 Moreover, by the time an aviation crash case
reaches the damage determination stage, the area where the ac-
cident occurred would most likely have changed considerably
from the time of the accident.
4. All Other Factors Which Would Make the Trial Easy,
Expeditious, and Inexpensive
The court addressed a potpourri of factors which would make
the trial easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. 106 The court ac-
knowledged the possibility of confusion arising from the transla-
tion of French documents and the translation of testimony from
French to English, in addition to the time and expense involved
in doing so. Other courts have held that requiring translation
of evidence into English "would result in significant cost to the
parties and delay to the court," and should thus be a factor that
"militates strongly" in favor of dismissal to the foreign coun-
try. 1 7 The district court did not embrace this approach.
Instead, the court resorted to two novel "factors"-France's
lack of contingent fee arrangements, and the amount of money
so far invested in the case by the plaintiffs and their U.S. attor-
neys-to hold that the factors which would make the trial easy,
expeditious and inexpensive were also a "wash." The court ob-
served that "the absence of contingent fee arrangements in
France may place a considerable burden on the plaintiffs in the
French Actions if the cases are dismissed here."1 0 8 While sug-
gesting that the "absence of contingent fee arrangements in
France . . . should not be given 'substantial weight,"' the court
concluded that "the absence of contingent fee arrangements in
104 Gonzales v. P.T. Pelange Niagra Mitra Inter'l, 196 F. Supp. 2d 482, 490
(S.D. Tex. 2002); see also Lueck, 236 F.3d at 1146-47.
105 In re Air Crash off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
106 Id. at 208.
107 Blanco v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, 997 F.2d 974, 982 (2d Cir. 1993).
108 In re Air Crash off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 217.
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a foreign forum is a, permissible factor to weigh in the forum
non conveniens analysis."'10 9 The court reasoned that:
Defendants' willingness not to contest liability as to compensa-
tory damages will not necessarily eliminate the concern that
French Action plaintiffs may incur financial hardship in finding
and retaining appropriate French counsel to pursue their claims
if the claims were to be dismissed from this Court. Plaintiffs and
their attorneys here, of course, have already invested time and
money on discovery, independent investigations, experts, consul-
tants, and pretrial proceedings." l'
The court thus seems to rely on the absence of contingency
fee arrangements as a major factor to outweigh most or all the
inconveniences of having witnesses and evidence transported
across the ocean. In so doing, the court may well have set a
precedent for preventing any FNC dismissal when a foreign
country is involved that, unlike the United States, does not have
contingency fee arrangements.'11 And since there are few, if
any, foreign countries that have or allow contingency fee ar-
rangements, the district court's rationale, for all practical pur-
poses, could close the door on all future FNC transfers abroad
from New York's Southern District.
Moreover, the court's decision in this respect is directly con-
trary to Magnin v. Teledyne Continental Motors, where the plaintiff
similarly argued that his cause of action should not be dismissed
on FNC grounds because France does not have contingency fee
arrangements.' 12 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the con-
tingency fee arrangements of other countries should not be
given significant weight in an FNC analysis:
As cherished as trial by jury is in our law, and as cherished as
contingency fee arrangements have become to some plaintiffs
and their attorneys, Magnin has not cited us to any Supreme
Court or court of appeals decision giving such considerations
substantial weight in forum non conveniens analysis. The argu-
ment is particularly weak in regard to contingency fees. In Coakes
v. Arabian American Oil Co., 831 F.2d 572, 576 (5th Cir. 1987), the
Fifth Circuit held that the ban against contingency fees in En-
gland should not significantly influence the forum non con-
veniens determination, and observed that, "[i]f the lack of a
109 Id.
110 Id.
11 Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits: an Increasingly Popular
(And Legal) Business, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 72, n. 128 (2000).
112 Magnin v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, 91 F.3d 1424 (11 Cir. 1996).
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contingent fee system were held determinative, then a case could
almost never be dismissed because contingency fees are not al-
lowed in most forums."' 13
The court noted that there was an advantage to resolving all
actions in a single forum and acknowledged that there were
other TWA 800 related actions already pending in France." 4
But this factor too was illusory.
While using the "weight" of the absence of contingency fee
arrangements to conclude that the private interest factors were
neutral, the court then weighed the public interest factors and




C. PUBLIC INTEREST FACTORS
Among the public interest factors that the court found per-
suasive in retaining jurisdiction was the proximity of the crash to
the court:
The catastrophe happened not far from this Courthouse. The
investigation into the cause of the catastrophe has been enor-
mously extensive and costly, consuming the energy and resources
of multiple administrative agencies of the United States Govern-
ment and of the State of New York. Congress has held hearings
and Vice-President Gore has headed a Presidential Commission
on the crash. 16
Other than evidencing the difficulty encountered by U.S. gov-
ernment authorities in retrieving the wreckage and then ascer-
taining the cause of the TWA 800 crash, there is no indication
how any of this was at all relevant to the issue of an FNC trans-
fer. The fact that the catastrophe happened not far from the
courthouse and generated extensive press coverage throughout
the country is simply not relevant to the issue of damages, much
less to calculating a French victim's damages. There is no logic
to the proposition that merely because a crash occurs in or near
13 Id. The Second Circuit has also held that completing discovery and invest-
ing financial resources does not sufficiently "tip the scales of the Gilbert balance
especially since plaintiffs are free to use the existing discovery material to
whatever a French tribunal will permit." Alfadda v. Fenn, 159 F.3rd 41, 48 (2d Cir.
1998).
114 In re Air Crash off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 217. The court noted that
the French Department of Treasury had filed actions against TWA in France to
recoup payments made to French beneficiaries, two of whom had actions in front
of the district court. Also the relevant Caisse Primaire d'Assurances Maladie had
filed actions against TWA to recoup social security like benefits paid. Id. at 209.
115 Id. at 217.
116 Id.
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the United States, all foreign victims of that crash must have
their compensation determined in U.S. courts. The place of ac-
cident is invariably fortuitous in aviation disasters and, hence,
should be of no weight in deciding a forum non conveniens
transfer. Nor should any weight be given to the size, scope or
expense of the subsequent investigation the U.S. conducts about
the cause of the crash. Neither the place of accident nor the
scope and size of an aviation accident investigation has ever
been treated as a factor in the Gilbert analysis, and there is no
persuasive reason why either should. Indeed, the place of acci-
dent was intentionally not included as a forum option in the
original Article 28 of the Convention, and it ought not now be
imported into Article 28 by way of becoming a new and influen-
tial psuedo-Gilbert factor.
1. Administrative Difficulties with Congested Dockets
In weighing the factor of administrative difficulties with con-
gested dockets, the district court noted that dismissal of the
French Actions would not cause the entire case to be dis-
missed.' 17 But while it is true that the entire case would not be
dismissed, the number of plaintiffs putting forth evidence of
damages would be considerably reduced. Also, the issue of dam-
ages, absent settlement, would normally be tried separately for
each plaintiff, as each plaintiff must individually prove his dam-
ages. Accordingly, and again absent settlement, dismissing the
foreign plaintiffs' causes of action should very substantially re-
duce the amount of time the jury is required to be empanelled
and would thus substantially ease the congested docket in the
Southern District of New York.
2. Jury Duty as a Burden That Should Not Be Imposed upon a
Community Which Has No Relation to the Litigation
In analyzing whether jury duty is a burden that should not be
imposed upon a community having no relation to the litigation,
the court held that it would not be unfair to impose jury duty
upon the community, as jury duty would also be imposed as to
the non-French plaintiffs. 1 8 But this totally ignores the addi-
tional time the jury would be empanelled (absent settlement) to
decide damage issues for each French plaintiff, including the
added time and expense required for translation of documents




and, when necessary, explanations of French law. There is no
persuasive reason why such an obligation should be imposed
upon a United States jury when, as here, it is more convenient
for the damage issues to be tried in the foreign country and
where the foreign country has a substantially greater interest in
seeing its citizens adequately and fairly compensated. This issue
thus also clearly weighs in favor of dismissal.
3. Local Interest in Having Local Controversies Decided Locally
The third public interest factor is whether there is a local in-
terest in having local controversies decided locally. Even
though the accident occurred off the coast of New York, New
York has virtually no interest, as previously discussed, in hearing
or adjudging the French plaintiffs' demands for damages. The
controversy here is not over liability for, or causation of, the ac-
cident, but only over the amount of damages foreign victims or
their survivors should properly recover.
Courts have generally held that the courts of a plaintiffs resi-
dence or domicile have a strong interest in assuring that its re-
sidents are adequately and fairly compensated with damages." 9
In Coyle, a case involving a U.S. citizen injured in an air crash in
Indonesia, the court held that Indonesia had less of a local inter-
est than the U.S.' 2 ° If the plaintiff is a foreign plaintiff, the
United States community in which the plaintiff files suit will
most probably have little, if any, relation to or interest in the
suit. Additionally, as there would be no issue of liability, even if
the community happened to be the site of the accident, it still
would not have any relation to a cause of action brought solely
to determine a plaintiffs damages, unless the plaintiff were a
member of that community. If the plaintiff is not a resident or
domiciliary of the United States, courts in this country simply do
not have a local interest in having the controversy decided here.
When the sole issue of litigation is the amount of damages a
119 See Coyle, supra note 22 and accompanying text; Bouvy-Loggers v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18792, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 1978);
Dahl v. United Techs. Corp., 632 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1980) (dismissing and apply-
ing the FNC doctrine in favor of a Norwegian forum in case involving Norwegian
victims of a North Sea helicopter crash); Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637
F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (affirming an FMC dismissal of French, Norwe-
gian, British and even U.S. victims of another North Sea helicopter crash in favor
of suit in appropriate different foreign fora, and specifically concluding that U.S.
citizenship or residence alone does not automatically provide a non-resident U.S.
citizen plaintiff with an "indefeasible right of access to the federal courts").
120 Coyle, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 1177.
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plaintiff should be awarded, the interest in that award lies with
the locality in which the decedent or the plaintiff resides. En-
suring that a cause of action is brought in a forum that has an
actual interest in the cause of action is a signal purpose of FNC.
France, indeed, has the only actual interest in determining the
damages that should be awarded to French plaintiffs and in en-
suring that they are adequately and fairly compensated.
4. Conflicts of Law Questions and Foreign Law Should Not Be
Forced Upon a Non Local Court Where the Local Court
Could Apply Its Own Laws
This last of the Gilbert public interest factors is perhaps the
easiest. Even the district court acknowledged that applying for-
eign law and resolving conflicts of law issues weighed in favor of
dismissal. Yet, weighing against dismissal, so the court held, was
"the piecemeal litigation that would be created by dismissing the
French Actions .. . [t]he prospect of several trials simultane-
ously taking place in different countries around the world."'
' 21
But according weight to this additional new "piecemeal litiga-
tion" factor will have much the same impact as according weight
to the new "contingency fee" factor. Taken either together or
alone, these two new factors, when added to any scale, will have
the inevitable impact of effectively foreclosing any future FNC
transfers to foreign courts.
Whether or not unanimity exists for the view that it is always
preferable for foreign plaintiffs to be awarded accident or death
compensation by the courts of the countries where they are citi-
zens or domiciliaries, a much more difficult proposition to ar-
gue against is that, at the least, their compensation should be
determined by the laws and practices of their domicile not by
those of the foreign forum where they opt to sue primarily for
tactical or monetary advantage. Because of the acknowledged
difficulties involved in determining foreign compensation laws
and practices, however, the conclusion seems ineluctable that
the better approach is to return the plaintiff to his or her domi-
cile forum for a fair and accurate calculation of death and injury
damages. 122
121 In re Air Crash off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 217-18.
122 Allan I. Mendelsohn, Domicile and the Warsaw System, 22-1 ANNALS OF AmR &
SPACE L. 137 (1997). For a critical analysis of a contrary conclusion reached by a
federal district court in the context of the oil pollution disaster caused by the
breakup of the Amoco Cadiz oil tanker off the coast of France, see Nancy Es-
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Although never mentioned in the decision, France and the
U.S. have an FCN treaty providing for national treatment in and
equal access to courts. But for the same reasons as were dis-
cussed earlier,' 23 this should not affect the foregoing analysis.
The French plaintiffs will be receiving the same access and have
much the same standards applied to them as would be applied
to out-of-state residents filing suit in New York. Reyno clearly
held that less deference should be accorded a foreign plaintiffs
choice of forum. 124 The district court appeared to ignore this
teaching. Because the predominant private and public interest
factors weigh so clearly in favor of dismissal, the district court
erred in not dismissing the French plaintiffs' claims on FNC
grounds. 12
5
5. The District Court's Failure to Follow Established Precedent
In reaching its decision, the district court also ignored prior
FNC precedent in its own district. In Bouvy-Loggers v. Pan Ameri-
can World Airways, Inc., one of the cases resulting from the 1997
Pan Am/KLM crash at Tennerife, the Dutch survivors of a KLM
crew member and Dutch citizen brought suit against Pan Am in
the Southern District of New York. 26 The only relevant issue
was the amount of damages, and Pan Am moved the court for
an FNC dismissal. The plaintiff argued that Pan Am was a New
York corporation, their pilots resided in New York, and all of
their records were in New York. The court properly noted that
these contacts would be relevant only if there were a question
regarding defendant's liability. 127 Pan Am and KLM had agreed
kanazi, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: In re: The Amoco Cadiz Oil Spill,
24J. MAR. L. & Com. 371 (1984).
123 See supra discussion at V.
124 Reyno, 102 U.S. at 265.
125 One of the factors that supports the court's decision is that the motion to
dismiss on FNC grounds was not filed until 21/2 years after the first case was filed
and 2 years after the court held its first hearing. The reported decision discloses
no reason for such a delayed filing on such an important issue. In re Air Crash off
Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 210-11.
126 Bouvy-Loggers v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18792
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 1978). The plaintiff did not join KLM as an additional defen-
dant, and Pan Am argued that the district court would not have had jurisdiction
over KLM under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention. Pan Am then argued that
Holland was the proper forum, as both defendants could be sued there together.
Id. at *1-2, n.1.
127 Id. at *4. Among other contacts cited by the plaintiff were that the Pan Am
pilot and First Officer both resided in New York, that other Pan Am crew mem-
bers who would be witnesses resided in New York and could therefore be subpoe-
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not to contest liability for the crash and the plaintiff agreed not
to seek punitive damages. Liability therefore was no longer at
issue, and the only remaining issue was the amount of damages.
As all the witnesses and documents relevant to this issue were
located in Holland, the court held that "bring[ing] these wit-
nesses and documents to New York for trial as opposed to con-
ducting the trial in The Netherlands would clearly be
inconsistent with the goal of making the disposition of the cases
'easy, expeditious and inexpensive.'" 28 The court held further
that: "The Netherlands has a strong interest in ensuring that this
Dutch decedent's heirs are adequately compensated, for if they
are not, it is The Netherlands and its citizens who will bear the
financial responsibility for supporting them."'129
A very similar forum non conveniens analysis and dismissal
occurred in In re Disaster at Riyadh Airport.'30 A fire broke out on
board a regularly scheduled Saudi Arabian Airline (SAA) flight
from Riyadh to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The pilot was able to re-
turn the plane to Riyadh, but all the occupants had perished
from smoke and poison gas inhalation caused in part by the fail-
ure of the doors and emergency exits to open. Suits were
brought-in various U.S. courts and then consolidated-in
Washington, D.C. by the survivors of the victims (who had multi-
ple citizenships, including Algeria, China, Egypt, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Germany, the U.K. and Saudi Arabia) against SAA, TWA
(which trained the SAA employees), and Lockheed (which man-
ufactured the plane). The defendants filed a joint motion to
dismiss based on FNC grounds, and specifically agreed to submit
themselves, at plaintiffs' option, to the jurisdiction of the na-
tional courts in Saudi Arabia, or the courts in each plaintiffs'
domicile, or the courts in any other country with jurisdiction
under Warsaw Article 28.1"
In examining Gilbert's public interest factors, the court noted
that the only contacts between the U.S. and the accident were
that Lockheed manufactured the aircraft involved and that years
naed by the court, that all of Pan Am's executive, training and supervisory
personnel were headquartered in New York, that all the FAA personnel who par-
ticipated in the accident investigation were located at the FAA's regional office at
JFK and reside in the New York area, and that KLM had its North American
headquarters in New York.
128 Id. at *5 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)).
129 Id. at *6.
130 In reAir Disaster at Riyadh Airport, 540 F. Supp. 1141, 1142 (D. D.C. 1982).
'31 Id. at 1145 n. 9 and accompanying text.
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earlier TWA had trained the personnel using the aircraft. Be-
cause these contacts were so tenuous, the court found no suffi-
cient reason to burden the citizens of the United States by
imposing jury duty on them or clogging the courts.132
For their part, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants can-
not create an alternative forum under Warsaw simply by con-
senting to jurisdiction. But the court disagreed, holding that,
although the defendants' consents did indeed create alternative
fora, the Supreme Court's Reyno analysis must still be applied
and, despite differences between the legal systems-e.g.,
"smaller damage awards" and "the inability to utilize a contin-
gent fee arrangement"-the alternative fora were not inade-
quate. 13 3 In applying the private interest factors, the court
noted that the first factor (i.e., the relative ease of access to
sources of proof) would be a nonissue, as the defendants would
not contest liability except as to proof of damages. In applying
the second private interest factor (i.e., the availability of com-
pulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses), the court
held that:
Since the damages evidence is within the compulsory reach of
the courts in the plaintiffs decedent's domiciles, and apparently
not within the compulsory reach of the United States, analysis of
this compulsory process factor in light of the defendants' conces-
sion likewise argues strongly in favor of using the foreign forums
in each plaintiffs domicile. 1"4
Finding that "the courts in each decedent's domicile also have
a stronger interest in trying these cases, and thereby protecting
their own citizens' rights than the United States does," the court
concluded that it "must recognize both the important legitimate
interests of the foreign forums in these cases... and 'the ability
of foreign courts to perform their adjudicatory functions fully as
well as do the courts of the United States."' 135
VII. CONCLUSION
The progress made by national and international law over the
past 25 years in aviation accident litigation, the Warsaw Conven-
tion, and forum non conveniens has been nothing short of re-
132 Id. at 1152.
133 Id. at 1145-46.
134 Id. at 1148.
135 Id. at 1153-54 (quoting Pain v. United Techs. Corp., 637 F.2d 774, 797 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)).
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markable. In the case of Warsaw, liability limits have increased
from the 1929 treaty limit of $8,300, to the 1966 adoption of
absolute liability with an increased limit of $75,000 (by a private
intercarrier agreement). Now, the United States is about to
ratify the 1999 Montreal Convention that preserves absolute lia-
bility and adopts a limit of $130,000, thus assuring some com-
pensation in all international air crash cases, even those caused
by acts of terrorism. In addition, and for the first time in air law,
Montreal 1999 allows proven compensatory damages without
limit and under a rebuttable presumption of negligence.
In contrast to the 1950s, when air crash cases were tried indi-
vidually, we now have increasingly sophisticated multidistrict liti-
gation arrangements that accommodate the escalating size and
passenger capacity of aircraft and expedite the progress of litiga-
tion from almost the moment the first case is filed to the day
when the last case is settled. In the judicial administration of
these cases, the courts have become skilled and uniformly adept
in applying the teachings of Gilbert and Reyno and, where appro-
priate, transferring back to their domicile courts foreign plain-
tiffs who opt to sue in this country. These foreign plaintiffs
choose U.S. courts not because of any direct connection be-
tween this country and the accident, but rather because of the
advantages of contingency fee arrangements readily available in
U.S. practice, or because they hope to benefit by the higher and
more generous recoveries that are usually available in U.S.
courts and from U.S. juries. What is perhaps most significant is
that the district courts and courts of appeals that have enter-
tained these cases have faced the issues, as did the district court
in Jennings v. Boeing Co., "squarely" and without trying to paper
over what some might otherwise view as "crass" motives for judi-
cial and forum choices.
There has truly been a pervasive intellectual activism in this
field both within the courts and on the part of the plaintiffs' and
defendants' bars. One can appreciate this activism simply by re-
viewing the many recent decisions of courts faced with the issues
we have been discussing in this paper and realizing how the
often criticized adversarial system works so reasonably well in
the continuing search for the best result.
To be sure, there are always detours on the path of progress,
and we would be less than frank if we did not include the TWA
800 decision in this category. Especially when the only issue is
that of the damages that should be awarded to foreign plaintiffs
or their survivors, we believe it is inappropriate to include the
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place of accident, let alone the availability of contingency fee
arrangements, as factors of any real significance in the Gilbert/
Reyno balancing of interests. Doing so will inevitably skew the
balance and make it virtually impossible for forum non con-
veniens ever to be granted by a U.S. court in an aviation acci-
dent case.
Perhaps the single most important factor that will influence
decisions in this area of the law in the future is the adoption in
the 1999 Montreal Convention of the forum of the victim's
"principal and permanent residence" as a "fifth forum" under
what is now Article 28 of Warsaw, but will shortly become (on
U.S. ratification and entry into force) Article 33(2) of the 1999
Montreal Convention. Once the U.S. ratifies that Convention, it
is a certainty that it will enter into force and become effective
very shortly thereafter (i.e., 60 days after the 30th country rati-
fies). It is equally certain that Article 33(2) should and will be-
come a major factor in the Gilbert/Reyno balance. For, in
addition to providing a U.S. forum for almost all U.S. citizens
and permanent residents injured or killed while abroad on an
international air trip, the provision and the history that led up
to its adoption expresses a distinct preference within the inter-
national community for allowing, indeed encouraging, foreign
victims of international air crashes to sue in the fora of their
own "principal and permanent residence[s]." To that extent,
the balancing of interests in Gilbert and Reyno should have a new,
and in this instance, we hope, critically heavy factor.
VIII. EPILOGUE
As this paper was en route to publication, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals issued its decision in Hosaka v. United Air-
lines.'36 That case involved Japanese tourists, flying on a round-
trip between Tokyo and Hawaii, who were injured (including
one fatality) when the flight encountered severe and unantici-
pated turbulence three hours outside of Tokyo. The flight re-
turned to Tokyo, the injured passengers were presumably
treated, and some time later 46 of the passengers or their family
members brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of California. On a motion by United, the district
court granted a forum non conveniens dismissal to the courts of
Japan. On appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit examined the
legislative history of both Warsaw Article 28 and Montreal 1999
1'-3 Hosaka v. United Airlines, 305 F. 3d 989 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Article 33 and concluded-despite substantial and acknowl-
edged federal court precedent to the contrary-that the proce-
dural tool of forum non conveniens was not available under
Warsaw Article 28(2).37
It is not for these authors at this time to analyze the bases for
the court's decision-perhaps only another detour on the path
of progress-other than to say that at least to our knowledge,
and despite the consistent arguments to the contrary by plain-
tiffs' counsel in many prior Warsaw cases, there is no compara-
ble decision in any federal court. One might quibble, as we
have in the context of the TWA 800 decision, with what weight
should be accorded to particular Gilbert or other factors. But
there always seemed to be general agreement, until the Hosaka
decision, not only that FNC was a procedural tool available to
federal courts under Warsaw Article 28(2), but that it would be
equally available under Article 33(4) of Montreal 1999, when
that Convention, is ratified by, and becomes effective for, the
United States. That the impact of the Hosaka decision, if not
overturned, would be to render largely irrelevant much of the
Warsaw-related discussion in the prior pages of this article (at
least for Ninth Circuit purposes) is clear. It seems equally clear
that, to the extent the Hosaka decision remains viable, the re-
markable progress that has been made under Gilbert, Reyno and
Warsaw Article 28 over the past two decades may well be endan-
gered. As of the time of this writing, a petition for certiorari has
been filed, and the U.S. Air Transport Association has filed an
amicus brief in support of the petition.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Hosaka is that it seems not to acknowledge that the Exec-
utive Branch of the U.S. Government has given extensive
thought and consideration to the question of forum non con-
veniens in the international aviation context. In the negotiation
of Article 33 of Montreal 1999, the United States not only in-
sisted on the inclusion of the "fifth forum" butjustified its inclu-
sion in part on the fact that a "fifth forum" provision would work
to reduce the extent to which American courts become the
courts of first resort for aviation accident victims of all nationali-
ties. There is concern in some parts of the world that the Ameri-
can trend toward escalating damage awards could be exported
abroad. To the extent that victims of aviation mishaps will be
able to bring their damage suits initially in the courts of their
137 Id. at 1004.
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permanent residences, and to the extent that U.S. courts under
Article 33 (4) will thus be able more readily to transfer such cases
to those courts, it was hoped that America's penchant for gener-
ous death and accident compensation awards might not be so
readily exportable.
To that end, the United States during the 1999 Montreal con-
ference prepared and submitted to the conference a paper that
addressed the critical importance of the "fifth forum." That pa-
per spoke about the added protection that the "fifth forum"
would provide for U.S. citizens who are traveling abroad-with
so much greater frequency than was true years ago. It spoke
equally about the desirability of reducing the growing popularity
of foreign plaintiffs' "forum shopping" in U.S. courts. As the
U.S. Government stated in that paper:
[T] he presence of a fifth jurisdiction could well result in fewer
"forum shoppers" winding up in U.S. courts. With a convenient
"homeland" court available to them, more non-U.S. residents will
choose to sue in their "home court," rather than to bring suit in
the U.S. Furthermore, U.S. courts are far more likely to dismiss
lawsuits brought by non-U.S. residents on the grounds of forum
non conveniens if a convenient homeland court is available to
the plaintiff because of the fifth jurisdiction.1 38
The international aviation community is waiting anxiously to
see the weight that will be accorded to these considered and
expressed intentions of the U.S. Executive Branch in negotiat-
ing a critically important provision of the 1999 Montreal
Convention. 139
138 See Legal Considerations Relating to the Fifth Jurisdiction, THE FIFTH JURISDIC-
TION 3, in II ICAO, International Conference on Air Law 101 (1999).
139 On February 21, 2003, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hosaka. The
search for a uniform approach to this issue remains elusive.
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